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NO TIME IS THE RIGHT TIME: THE SUPREME COURT'S
USE OF RIPENESS TO BLOCK JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
FOREST PLANS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PLAINTIFFS IN
OHIO FORESTRY ASS'N V. SIERRA CLUB
EACATA DESIRtE GREGORY*

INTRODUCTION

Continuing what one commentator has called the "equivalent of
Sherman's march through Georgia"1 with respect to the justiciability
of claims filed by environmental groups, the Supreme Court decided
Ohio ForestryAss'n v. Sierra Club2 in May 1998. The case involved a

challenge by the Sierra Club and various other environmental groups
against the United States Forest Service over the Land and Resource
Management Plan ("Forest Plan") that the Forest Service adopted for
Wayne National Forest. 3 The Sierra Club argued that the Forest Plan

allowed too much logging of the forest in general and too much
clearcutting in particular.4 The plaintiffs sought to challenge the
Forest Plan because it dictated an overall management procedure
that was unsatisfactory and they believed that they should not have to
wait until actual logging was proposed in order to seek judicial
review.5
The lawsuit raised the question of whether planning regulations

rather than site-specific actions were suitable for review by the Court.
The issue had arisen in several courts, resulting in a split over whether

* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2000; B.A., English, Tulane University,
1997. The author wishes to thank Dean Stuart Deutsch for his guidance and suggestions and
John Siemsen for his valuable editing of this comment.
1. William Funk, Supreme Court News, 23 ADMIN. & REG.L. NEws 4 (1998). It has also
been termed a continuing "crusade to deprive conservation groups of their ability to review
governmental action in the courts." Philip Weinberg, Are Standing Requirements Becoming a
GreatBarrierReef Against EnvironmentalActions?, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11 (1999).

2. 523 U.S. 726 (1998).
3. See id. at 728.

4. See Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. 485, 490 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd sub nom.
Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated sub nom. Ohio Forestry Ass'n v.
Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998).
5. See id. at 488.
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or not these Forest Plans were justiciable at the planning stage. 6 In a
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that they were not
justiciable, agreeing with the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits that
without site-specific, on-the-ground activities the Forest Plans were
7
not ripe for judicial review.
This Comment contends that Forest Plans do constitute final
agency actions that are ripe for review even without site-specific
The Supreme Court's decision,
actions implementing them.
therefore, reflects the continuing use of justiciability doctrines as
barriers to restrict environmental groups' access to the courts. Part I
explains the ripeness doctrine and sets forth the test generally used by
courts to evaluate whether or not a claim is fit for judicial review.
The doctrine arose in the context of suits against a regulatory agency
by a regulated entity and, therefore, can be difficult to apply fairly in
Part II discusses the type of Plan in
environmental cases.
controversy, a Forest Plan, and how the various circuits have
addressed the question of whether these Plans are final agency
actions ripe for judicial review. Part III details the factual and
procedural history of the Ohio Forestry case. Part IV argues that the
Supreme Court incorrectly held that the case was unripe and, as a
result of this holding, effective and efficient judicial review of agency
actions could be eliminated.
I. RIPENESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWSUITS

A. The Ripeness Doctrine

Ripeness is a doctrine that relates to the timing of judicial
review,8 asking if the court is equipped to adjudicate the issues before
it. The basic rationale of the ripeness doctrine is "to prevent courts,
through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and
also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a
concrete way by the challenging parties. 9
Ripeness began as a judicially created prudential concern 10
6. See infra notes 97-98.
7. See Ohio Forestry,523 U.S. at 726.
8. See Catherine Caldwell, Note, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV.349, 352 n.20 (1982).

9. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
10. Prudential concerns are those that take practicality into consideration, such as limiting
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supported by policy considerations, pragmatini,; and the courts'
desire to avoid judicial review of agency actiont that may be modified
or never enforced. 1 The Supreme Court expressed these prudential
considerations by developing a two-part ripeness test. The first step
involved an evaluation of "the fitness of the issues for judicial
decision" and the second, "the hardship to the parties of withholding
''
court consideration. 12
Courts evaluate several factors in determining whether the
fitness requirement of the test is met. 13 One is that the issues involved
should be legal ones. 4 Another is whether the agency action at issue
constitutes "final agency action" as mandated under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),' 5 a concept often referred to
as finality.16 Indeed, it has been suggested that finality may be the key
element in determining not only fitness, but ripeness as a whole.',
court dockets and overall efficiency and, as such, are entirely discretionary in nature. The
Supreme Court began to incorporate constitutional considerations into the ripeness inquiry in a
series of cases beginning in the mid-1970s. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 162-63 (1987). Ripeness was viewed as "a 'threshold'
determination designed to measure whether the 'actual controversy' ... requirement imposed
by Article III of the constitution is met." Id. at 163. For a discussion of the constitutional
aspects of ripeness, see generally R. George Wright, The Timing of Judicial Review of
Administrative Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Overlapping Doctrines, 11 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 83 (1987) (arguing that ripeness has an Article II as well as an Article III component);
cf Nichol, supra (arguing that, because of the implied rigidity and formalism of the
constitutionalized version, ripeness should have remained a purely prudential doctrine).
11. See Maria Cristiano, Note, 2 SETON HALL CONsT. L.J. 445,467 (1991).
12 Abbott Lab., 387 U.S. at 149. Inconsistencies arise in courts applying the Abbott Labs
test over (1) whether an issue must be both fit and cause hardship and (2) how severe the
hardship must be in order to be ripe and how imminent the proposed action must be before
review is possible. See Caldwell, supra note 8, at 356-57. Most courts have taken a flexible
approach and simply balance the various elements. See id. at 357.
13. Courts consider, for example, if the record before the Court is complete enough to
provide sufficient information about the relevant issues. See Cristiano, supra note 11, at 467-68
n.115.
14. See Abbott Lab., 387 U.S. at 149.
15. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1994).
16. Technically, the statutorily based finality is a separate doctrine from judicially created
ripeness. See Wright, supra note 10, at 87. However, there is great confusion and inconsistency
in judicial application of the two doctrines such that finality has essentially been amalgamated
into the ripeness doctrine. See Caldwell, supra note 8, at 354. Some courts treat the two as
separate, see, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Commissioners, 740 F.2d 21 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), others incorporate finality into the Abbott Labs test for ripeness, see, e.g., NRDC v.
EPA, 859 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1988), while others view the two doctrines as the same thing, see,
e.g., Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1983). It has been suggested that there is
no need to distinguish the two doctrines, particularly since the Supreme Court has apparently
ceased to distinguish between them. See Matthew Porterfield, Agency Action, Finality and
GeographicalNexus: Judicial Review of Agency Compliance with NEPA's Programmatic EIS
Requirement After Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 619, 651 n.173
(1994).
17. See Wright, supra note 10, at 87; see also, E. Gates Garrity-Rokous, Note, Preserving
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The hardship aspect of the ripeness test focuses on the practical
effects of the agency action and essentially involves a balancing of the
interests involved. 18 In environmental cases, the balancing is usually
between the validity of the agency's desire to avoid judicial
interference and the possibility that withholding review will injure the
plaintiff or ultimately preclude a remedy. 19 Here, the inquiry
becomes one of harm or injury rather than hardship. E0 This part of
the test, therefore, is used to determine whether the "asserted harm is
' 21
real and concrete rather than speculative and conjectural."
B. Abbott Laboratoriesv. Gardner
Generally regarded as the beginning of the modern ripeness
Abbott Labs involved a challenge by drug manufacturers to
Food and Drug Administration regulations that imposed labeling
requirements on prescription drug packaging and advertising. 23 The
Supreme Court formulated the two-part test for determining ripeness
and, after applying that test, concluded that the claim was ripe for
review. 24 Emphasizing that "finality" was to be interpreted in a
pragmatic way, the Court determined that the regulations constituted
final agency action as required under the APA because they were
formally promulgated, were effective upon publication, were
authorized directly by the statute, and had the status of law. 2 The
era, 22

Review of Undeclared Programs:A Statutory Redefinition of Final Agency Action, 101 YALE
L.J. 643, 647 n.31 (1991) (stating that finality is an essential precondition to ripeness and courts
look to finality to determine ripeness).
18. See Robert Power, Help Is Sometimes Close at Hand: The Exhaustion Problem and the
Ripeness Solution, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 547, 610 (1987) (stating that "the hardship aspect
necessarily involves balancing").
19. See Bridget Hust, Ripeness Doctrine in NEPA Cases:A Rotten JurisdictionalBarrier,11
L. & INEO. 505, 520 (1993).
20. See Maria Mansfield, Standing and Ripeness Revisited; The Supreme Court's
"Hypothetical" Barriers,68 N.D. L. REV. 1, 23 (1992). The Abbott Labs analysis differs in the
environmental setting. Rather than recognizing direct hardship to the plaintiffs, the analysis has
'more in common with an equitable irreparable injury inquiry." Id.
21. Nichol, supra note 10, at 162. This aspect of the ripeness doctrine parallels the standing
analysis' "injury-in-fact" requirement. See id. The similarities between ripeness and standing
have served to complicate the application of both doctrines and has lead one court to conclude
that "because courts don't draw meaningful distinctions between standing and ripeness, this
aspect of justiciability is one of the most confused areas of the law." Wilderness Soc'y v.
Alcock, 83 F.3d 386, 389-90 (11th Cir. 1996); see also infra note 104.
22. See Nichol, supra note 10, at 161.
23. 387 U.S. 136, 137-38 (1967).
24. See id. at 155. For a reiteration of the two-part test, see supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
25. See id.at 149,151.
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issues were therefore fit for judicial review. 6 , In evaluating the hardship component, the Court focussed on the
actual effects that the regulations would have on the plaintiffs. 27 The
Court reasoned that, because the regulations governed the business
affairs of the industry and affected daily business activities, 28 the
plaintiffs would feel a significant, direct and immediate impact while
the government had no countervailing interest in denying judicial
review. 29 Moreover, while the Court recognized the importance of
unimpeded agency administration of federal statutes, it stated that a
preenforcement challenge by the plaintiffs would work to speed
enforcement because it would produce a binding judgment that would
finally resolve the validity of the challenged regulations. 3° Since both
the fitness of the issues and the hardship analysis weighed in favor of
31
judicial review, the regulations were ripe.
The Abbott Labs test arose from, and is therefore most easily
applied to, cases involving a regulated entity suing over a regulation
that directly affects its behavior.32 Environmental cases, on the other
hand, generally involve challenges to agency actions by persons who
are not part of the regulated community.
Consequently, the
plaintiff's behavior will not be directly impacted by the challenged
26. See id. at 151.
27. See id. at 152.
2& See id.
29. See id. at 152-54.
30. See id. at 154.
31. See id. at 153. In an opinion handed down on the same day as Abbott Labs, in Toilet
Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967), the Supreme Court applied the Abbott Labs test
to find that the challenged regulations were not ripe for review. Toilet Goods involved a
regulation that allowed immediate suspension of certification service to businesses that refused
to admit FDA employees to the facilities for inspection. Id. at 161. While the Court conceded
that the case presented a legal question and that the regulation was a final agency action, see id.
at 162-63, the Court found that other factors outweighed those supporting judicial review. The
first was that the regulation was promulgated under a statute delegating authority to adopt
regulations "for the efficient enforcement" of the regulatory program. See id. at 163. The Court
concluded that its evaluation would therefore be more effective in the context of a specific
enforcement proceeding. See id. at 163-64. Hardship was further lacking because the impact of
the regulation did not immediately effect the primary conduct of the association. See id. at 164.
In this case, a failure to comply would only result in punitive measures that could be
administratively appealed and are subject to judicial review. See id. at 165.
The final case in the Abbott Labs trilogy, Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167
(1967), involved regulations issued by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and the
Commissioner of the FDA. Plaintiffs challenged the authority to issue the regulations that
increased the number of products that had to conform to the Act's "premarketing clearance
procedure." Id. at 169. The Court found that the case involved a legal issue concerning a "selfexecuting" regulation with an "immediate and substantial impact" on the plaintiff for which
noncompliance would result in penalties. Id. at 170-72. The case was therefore ripe for review.
See id. at 174.
32. See Mansfield, supra note 20, at 23.
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agency action in the same manner as illustrated in Abbott Labs. This

aspect makes the application of the doctrine in environmental cases
more problematic. 3 Ripeness, however, was not originally a serious
jurisdictional barrier for environmental plaintiffs following Abbott
Labs, as no defendant had successfully argued that the finality

requirement precluded judicial review of an agency program. 34 Then
came the Supreme Court's opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, in
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,35 which offered an extremely

formalistic approach to the ripeness doctrine. 36

C. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation
Lujan v. NWF involved a challenge filed by the National Wildlife
Federation in 1985 against the United States Department of the
Interior, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Director of the Bureau

of Land Management ("BLM") over the BLM's "land withdrawal
review program. '37 The "program" involved 1250 consistent decisions
issued by the BLM over several years regarding the declassification
determinations of government lands from a protected status. 38 These
decisions resulted in large tracts of land covering over 180 million
acres being opened to mining and other extraction activities. 39 The

suit was brought under the APA with the plaintiffs alleging violations
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA") 4° and
the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 41 claiming that the
42
reclassifications would cause widespread environmental damage.

33. It has even been argued that in environmental cases the categorization of a case as ripe
or unripe cannot be reduced to an orderly, principled, or predictable test. See Hust, supra note
19, at 521.
34. See Garrity-Rokous, supra note 17, at 644. Even the standing doctrine, which was once
used to limit the justiciability of claims for systematic redress, was expanded by the courts in a
series of decisions during the 1960s and 1970s. See id. at 644 n.l. The expansion of standing
culminated in the landmark case of Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), and reached its
most liberal point with the decision in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures ("SCRAP"), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). See Weinberg, supra note 1, at 2-3; see also infra
note 104.
35. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
36. See Hust, supra note 19, at 521. Several commentators have stated that Justice Scalia's
reasoning in Lujan v. NWF seemed to be geared towards inhibiting environmental litigation.
See, e.g., Cristiano, supra note 11, at 487; Mansfield, supra note 20, at 4.
37. 497 U.S. at 875.
3& See Cristiano, supra note 11, at 448 n.15.
39. See id.
40. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994).
41. Id. §§ 4321-4361 (1994).
42. See Lujan v. NWF, 497 U.S. at 879.
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The Supreme Court found that the agency decisions challenged
in the case were not ripe for review. 43 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court asserted that the "so-called 'land withdrawal review program'
was not an agency action, let alone a final agency action within the
meaning of the APA. 44 In the Court's view, the phrase "program" did
not indicate a single order or regulation but was merely a term of art
employed by the plaintiffs to refer to the activities undertaken by the
BLM in accordance with FLPMA regulations. 45 Instead, the program

was more akin to "rules of general applicability" which may or may
not threaten harm in the future." This was not final agency action
and the decisions were therefore not ripe for review. 47
The Court further asserted that, absent statutory provisions,
broad regulations are not "ripe for review under the APA until the
scope of the controversy has been reduced to more manageable

proportions, and its factual components fleshed out, by some concrete
action.., that harms or threatens to harm. '"48 Abbott Labs, generally
taken as the seminal statement on ripeness, was mentioned only as

"the major exception" to this rule.49 In conclusion, the Court stated
that the plaintiff could not seek "wholesale improvement of the

program from the Court" but would have to rely on Congress or the
"Except where Congress explicitly
agency itself for redress. 50
provides for our correction of the administrative process at a higher
level of generality, we intervene in the administration of the laws only

when... a specific final agency action has actual or immediately
51
threatened effect."

43. See id. at 892. The Court announced two holdings. The first was that the affidavits
were not specific enough, and the second was that the "program" was not a final agency action
under the APA. See id. at 891 n.2. It is also interesting to note that Lujan v. NWF was
technically a standing case yet the justices decided the standing issue by using ripeness. Id. at
891.
44. Id. at 890.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 892.
47. See id. at 891.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 894. This statement by the Court has been characterized as "somewhat myopic
and possibly inconsistent with both precedent and the spirit of APA review, particularly with
regard to environmental law." Lynn Robinson O'Donnell, Casenote, New Restrictions in
Environmental Litigation: Standing and Final Agency Action After Lujan v. NWF, 2 VILL.
ENVTL. J. 227, 245 (1991). Another critic stated that "there is no rule of standing nor any
notion stemming from separation of powers doctrine that subjects only... site-specific
government acts to court review. SCRAP belies this limiting construction, as do numerous
other decisions reviewing major far reaching activities of federal agencies." Weinberg, supra
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Lujan v. NWF has been interpreted by numerous commentators
as heralding the end of programmatic environmental relief for agency
actions with widespread environmental impacts. 2 The case has been
positively cited by agencies seeking to escape judicial scrutiny of their
actions, and has been criticized and distinguished by those trying to
protect the environment.53 While the holding of Lujan v. NWF does

seem to preclude review of undeclared agency programs, its effects
on other types of programs are not clear. 5 There has even been some
controversy about whether the Court's discussion of agency action
6
and finality was holding or dicta1
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FOREST PLANS
The APA limits the scope of judicial review to "final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy. 5 7 The APA,
however, does not define what exactly constitutes "final agency

action. 581 The matter, for the most part, has been left to the courts,
which have struggled to decide what agency actions are final enough
to warrant review.59 Additionally, the determination of finality is
note 1, at 5. Such cases include Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) (reviewing a nationwide air pollution rule promulgated by the EPA), and
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978) (reviewing a nationwide power plant licensing rule promulgated by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission).
52 See Porterfield, supra note 16, at 620.
53. See, e.g., Conservation Law Found. of New England v. Reilly, 950 F.2d 38 (1st Cir.
1991); Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364 (D. Colo. 1992); Marshall Breger,
Defending Defenders: Remarks on Nichol and Pierce, 42 DUKE L.J. 1202 (1993); Edward
Warren & Gary Marchant, "More Good Than Harm": A First Principlefor Environmental
Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 379 (1993).
54. See Garrity-Rokous, supranote 17, at 645.
55. See Porterfield, supranote 16, at 622.
56. See id. at 650 n.169. The dissent implies that it was dicta, see Lujan v. NWF, 497 U.S. at
913 (Blackmum, J., dissenting) ("Since the majority concludes in other portions... that the
Federation lacks standing... it is not clear to me why the Court engages in [this] hypothetical
inquiry .... ), while it has been taken as holding by some courts and commentators. See
Garrity-Rokous, supra note 17, at 645.
57. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994). The full sentence states: "Agency action made reviewable by
statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are
subject to judicial review." Id.
58. The phrase has been taken to mean that the agency has "announced, solidified, and
embraced" a particular position. Edward Sears, Note, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation:
Environmental Plaintiffs Are Tripped Up on Standing, 24 CONN. L. REv. 293, 313 (1991).
Agency action has also been deemed "final" when it is a definitive statement of the agency's
position or policy that reached the status of law through the imposition of obligations or
determinations of legal rights and is not a temporary or procedural decision. See U.S. DEIT OF
JusTIcE, ArroRNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE AmisTRATrvE PROCEDURE ACT 101-03
(1947).
59. See Hust, supra note 19, at 519.
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more difficult when the challenge is to a policy that is the basis for

agency action but not to a specific act by the agency. Such becomes
the issue when a program or plan is the target of the suit. 60 Following
the decision in Lujan v. NWF, the courts were faced with the question

of whether Land Resource Management Plans ("LRMPs")
promulgated pursuant to the National Forest Management Act
("NFMA")61 constituted final agency action that was ripe for review. 62
A. ForestPlanningand LRMPs

Forest Plans are prepared by the Forest Service as part of the
management of the national forest system. 63 The broad management
framework of Forest Service operations is guided by the Organic
Act 64 and the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act ("MUSYA"), 6 while
the NFMA and NEPA dictate how local resource management and
public participation are handled. 6 The NFMA requires the Forest
Service to develop individual LRMPs to direct the management of

each forest. 67 Once approved, these highly detailed plans are binding
6
on all activities within the forest for ten to fifteen years.
The planning process has several steps. First, all forest resources

are inventoried and data are collected. 69 Next, the Forest Plan is
60. A program is "an agency decision calling for the consistent application of a general
policy to individual parties." Garrity-Rokous, supra note 17, at 644.
61. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994).
62. See Kelly Murphy, Cutting Through the Forest of the Standing Doctrine: Challenging
Resource Management Plans in the 8th and 9th Circuits, 18 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 223, 243

(1996).
63. See id. at 223. The following discussion is only a brief overview. For a more extensive
analysis of the history of forest management, see generally CHARLES WILKENSON & H.
MICHAEL ANDERSON, LAND & RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS (1987).

64. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482 (1994). The Organic Act was the statute that provided the
mandate for the management of the forest reserves in 1897. See Jack Tuholske & Beth
Brennan, The National Forest Management Act: Judicial Interpretation of a Substantive
Environmental Statute, 15 PUB. LAND L. REV. 53, 57 (1994). The Organic Act still plays a part

in Forest Service operations even though it was repealed by the NFMA. See Murphy, supra
note 62, at 232 n.46.
65. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1994).
66. See Murphy, supra note 62, at 232.
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a). National and regional Forest Plans are also prepared. See 36
C.F.R. § 219.4 (1998).
68. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f); 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(g). Revisions are made: "(1) from time to
time when the Secretary finds conditions in a unit have significantly changed, but at least every
15 years, and (2) in accordance with the provisions of subsection (e) and (f) of this section and
public involvement comparable to that required by subsection (d) of this section." 16 U.S.C. §
1604(f)(5). The regulations also require revision if changes in policies, goals, or objectives
would have a significant impact on forest projects. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(g).
69. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.12(d).
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developed by an interdisciplinary team, 0 a process that includes
analyzing the productivity potential of the forest unit,71 formulating
alternative management scenarios, 72 estimating the effect of such
74
alternatives,7 3 and performing detailed evaluation of those effects.
The forest supervisor then recommends one of the alternatives to the
regional forester. 75 Public participation occurs during this stage and
the proposed Forest Plan is opened to public comment for at least
three months. 76 If the proposed Forest Plan and final environmental
impact statement ("EIS") are approved, the regional forester must
prepare a Record of Decision ("ROD") explaining the decision. 77
The decision to approve the LRMP then becomes subject to
administrative appeal. 78 Finally, the Forest Plan is implemented in
79
site-specific projects.
While the specifics are left to the discretion of the agency, the
NFMA requires that Forest Plan development regulations take into
account program goals such as maintaining plant and animal
diversity,80 ensuring that timber harvesting will not cause irreversible
soil and watershed damage,81 and protecting water resources. 82
Though clearcutting is recognized as a legitimate method of timber
harvesting, it may only be used if it is the "optimum method"
available. 83
The Forest Plans control and direct forest development by
dividing the forest into several Management Areas ("MAs") akin to a
zoning map. 84 The Forest Plan provides development restrictions and
resource emphases for each area 8l and sets the guidelines to control
the type of development that is to occur within each type of MA. 86
70.
71.
72.
73.

See id. § 219.10(3).
See id. § 219.12(e).
See id. § 219.12(0.
See id. § 219.12(g).

74. See id. § 219.12(h).
75. See id. § 219.12(i).

76. See id. § 219.10(b).
77. See id. § 219.120).
78. See id. § 219.10(d).

79. See id. § 219.12(e).
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
81. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(E).
82 Id. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(iii).
83. See id. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(i).
84. See Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 64, at 65.
85. While not specified exactly in the NFMA or its regulations, certain provisions in the
regulations anticipate the "zoning" approach. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.11(c), .12(e).
86. See id. §§ 219.13-.27.
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After the land is zoned into a specific MA,. site-specific projects are
proposed which must be consistent with that-MA's standards. 87
In addition to the procedural provisions, the NFMA also
The most
contains several explicit substantive requirements.88
important is that the Forest Plan, once adopted, is the law for
management of that individual forest.89 "'Once forest plans become
final and are determined to be valid, they themselves become law,'
and 'are the engines that drive the management process,' [m]uch like
zoning requirements or administrative regulations." 90 The NFMA
states that all actions taken to implement forest plans "shall be
consistent with the land management plans." 91 Therefore, any
substantive decision approved as part of the Forest Plan is binding on
all subsequent management procedures. 92
The amendment process further demonstrates the binding nature
of the Forest Plans. 93 Under the NFMA, any "significant" change in a
Forest Plan may be made only after following the same procedure
required for the adoption of the full Forest Plan. 94 Thus, whenever a
change is proposed, it must go through the same inventory and data
collection, development, public notice, hearing, and adoption
procedure that the full Forest Plan went through initially.95
B. The CircuitSplit

Four circuit courts of appeals had addressed the issue of whether
environmental plaintiffs may challenge national Forest Plans at the
plan stage prior to the Supreme Court's decision. 96 Two circuits
decided in favor of the environmental plaintiffs with respect to the
justiciability of their claims, 97 while the other two dismissed the
87. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i).
8& See Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 64, at 66.
89. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i); 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(e).
90. Paul Garrahan, Note, Failing to See the Forest for the Trees: Standing to Challenge
NationalForest Management Plans, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 153 (1996) (quoting WILKINSON &
ANDERSON, supra note 63, at 74, 12).
91. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i).

92

See id.

93. See id. § 1604(0(4).
94. Id. § 1604(0(4).
95. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(f).
96. See infra notes 97-98.
97. The courts which granted judicial review of the Forest Plans were in the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits. See Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995); Resources Ltd. v.
Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 1993); Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508
(9th Cir. 1992).
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The plaintiffs,

various environmental groups and organizations, challenged the
LRMPs and their accompanying EISs, for their failure to consider or
implement more environmentally sound policies. 99 These challenges,
brought under the APA,100 alleged various violations of the NFMA
and NEPA. 101 The Forest Service in turn argued that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to sue and that their claims were not ripe for review
because the Forest Plans did not constitute final agency action.112
While two of the circuits emphasized standing rather than
ripeness in their discussion, 03 the analyses are similar. Indeed, the
courts' conflation of these doctrines is understandable considering
that the questions and concerns involved in a determination of the
two issues are closely interconnected.104 One court stated that, while
the doctrines of standing and ripeness ostensibly involve different

inquiries, they "are closely related, and in cases like this one perhaps
overlap entirely."105

Moreover, the standing question hinges on

98. The courts that denied review were located in the Eleventh and Eighth Circuits. See
Wilderness Soc'y v. Alcock, 83 F.3d 386 (11th Cir. 1996); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753
(8th Cir. 1994).
99. All of the plaintiffs in the various cases alleged that the LRMP for that specific forest
violated the NFMA and NEPA, though their suits focused on different harms such as excessive
logging or failing to adequately protect biodiversity.
100. When an environmental statute does not contain a citizen suit provision, judicial review
is generally available under the APA, which allows review to any "person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702.
101. The exception is Alcock, which only had a NFMA claim.
102. The Forest Service has consistently taken the position that Forest Plans do not have onthe-ground effects and are immune from judicial review. See Tuholske & Brennan, supra note
64, at 96.
103. See Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d at 753 (discussing the issue in terms of standing
alone); Alcock, 83 F.3d at 386 (addressing only ripeness).
104. The concept of standing arose from the "case or controversy" requirement in Article
III of the Constitution. See Mansfield, supra note 20, at 64. The doctrine has both
constitutional and prudential elements. See id. at 66. The three central constitutional
requirements needed to establish standing are: (1) injury-in-fact (2) causation and (3)
redressability. See id. at 65. The primary prudential requirement is that the plaintiff's injury
must fall within the "zone of interest" protected by the statute in question. See id. at 66.
While there has been much confusion surrounding standing and ripeness, see supra
note 21, they are different doctrines. Standing clearly is derived from the Constitution with
prudential limitations added later by the judiciary. See, e.g., Mansfield, supra note 20, at 66. Its
inquiry focuses on the identity of the parties bringing suit and the nature of the injury. See
Garrahan, supra note 90, at 181-82. Ripeness, on the other hand, presumably began as a
prudential concern with constitutional dictates added later. See supra note 10. Its focus is on
the timing of the injury as well as its substantiality, and the harm that delayed review will cause.
See Garahan, supra note 90, at 182.
105. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 610 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Smith v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Agric., 23 F.3d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also Idaho Conservation League v.
Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1518 n.20 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The standing question.., bears close
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finality, which is an important consideration in both the fitness and
hardship prongs of the Abbott Labs ripeness test. The following
discussion, therefore, will focus on ripeness.
1. Courts Finding that Forest Plans Are Ripe
The courts that found the Forest Plan challenges justiciable
rejected the argument that the issue would not be ripe until sitespecific action occurred. Instead, these courts held that the release of
the LRMP by the Forest Service constituted a final agency action
capable of judicial review. 1°6 These courts concluded that the Forest
Plans, even if programmatic in nature, caused harm. 10 7 In Idaho
Conservation League v. Mumma, 0 for example, the Court asserted
that the fact that the injury was threatened and contingent rather than
actual or certain, or that it would result from a chain of events, was

not enough to defeat the claim.1°9 Waiting for on-the-ground activity
would make little sense for, as the Court in Sierra Club v. Marita
stated, "one does not have to await the consummation of threatened
injury to obtain preventative relief.""' 0 The courts were also sensitive
to the numerous problems that would arise if plaintiffs had to wait
until site-specific projects were proposed. For example, a challenge
to a specific project would not provide an adequate remedy because
area designations would already be final,"' or implementation may
have progressed too far."2 Furthermore, any future site challenge
"would lose much [of its] force once the overall plan has been

affinity to questions of ripeness-whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant
judicial intervention.").
106. See, e.g., Mumma, 956 F.2d at 1519.
107. See, e.g., Marita, 46 F.3d at 611. The court gave several reasons for finding the Forest
Plans mandatory: (1) the regulations regarding planning are mandatory; (2) they guide all
natural resource management activities and establish management standards and guidelines for
the national forest; (3) Forest Plans determine management practices, resource production
levels, and suitability of land for timber production; and (4) all permits, contracts, and licenses
issued must be consistent with the plan. See id.
108. 956 F.2d at 1510. Six environmental groups challenged the LRMP for the Idaho
Panhandle. While they made several claims, the court only addressed the Forest Service's
decision to recommend 43 of 47 roadless areas in the forest against wilderness designation.
109. Id. at 1515.
110. 46 F.3d at 612 (quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553,593 (1923)).
111. See Mumma, 956 F.2d at 1516 n.16. The Mumma court recognized that even an
eventual "no-action" course for a project would not grant the areas the affirmative protection
that wilderness designation would. Id.
112. See, e.g., Marita, 46 F.3d at 612 ("If the Sierra Club had to wait until the project level to
address.., a broad issue like biological diversity, implementation... might have progressed too
far to permit proper redress.").
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.1 . .
approved."113
These circuit courts recognized that, if the problem was with the
Forest Plan as a whole, Waiting until an actual timber sale occurred
would not clarify the issues any further. As the Marita court asserted,
''arguments over the plan's sufficiency as a whole are as concrete now
as they will ever become. ' 114 Moreover, since the Forest Plans direct
all actions within the forest, in essence "predetermin[ing] the future,"
they represent a final agency action that is ripe for judicial review
115
now.

2. Courts Finding that Forest Plans Are Not Ripe
In contrast to the courts that allowed the plaintiffs' claims, the
courts that denied justiciability did not engage in a detailed discussion
of the issues. As far as these courts were concerned, the "mere
existence" of a Forest Plan could not produce an imminent injury and
the inquiry ended there. 116 In Sierra Club v. Robertson, for example,
the Court decided that the Forest Plan was only a general planning
tool that did not effectuate any changes or dictate any specific action;
without reference to a site-specific action, an attempt to find an injury
by the Forest Plan alone would take the court into the realm of
"'speculation and conjecture." 11' 7 At least one of the courts that
dismissed the claims as unjusticiable did require that when a sitespecific action is proposed the plaintiff may assert that the Forest
Plan is inconsistent with the governing statutes as it relates to the
proposed action.118
III. THE OHIO FORESTRY CASE

In 1981, the Forest Service began the process of developing a
Forest Plan, pursuant to the NFMA, for the management of the
113. Mumma, 956 F.2d at 1519 (quoting Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705,
708 (9th Cir. 1993)).
114. 46 F.3d at 613.
115. Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1304 (9th Cir. 1993). The case involved a
challenge to Flathead National Forest on the basis that implementation of the Forest Plan
would jeopardize the survival of endangered species in the forest in northern Montana. In
addition, this case also confirmed the continuing validity of Mumma which was questioned by
defendants in the wake of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
116. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 1994).
117. Id. (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974)).
118. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Alcock, 83 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir. 1996). The court made its
decision contingent on the concession that the plan could be challenged along with the site
action.
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177,701 acres of federally owned land in Wayne National Forest
located in southeastern Ohio.11 9 Following .the procedure set out in

the NFMA, 20° the Forest Service adopted the final Forest Plan, along
with a final EIS and ROD,'2 1 which would control the activity within
the forest for a ten-year period beginning in 1988.122
The Forest Plan divided Wayne into fifteen MAs within which
the silivicultural systems1 3 and harvest methods were specified. 124

Approximately 126,107 acres of the land were designated for logging,
with 80% using an "even-edged" management harvesting technique,

which, in the majority of cases, means clearcutting.'

5

The other 20%

percent would be harvested using uneven-edged management. 126 The

Forest Plan projected that approximately 8000 acres would be
logged, 127 5075 acres by clearcutting.128 Over the ten-year life of the
Forest Plan, logging would be permitted for up to 7.5 million board
feet of timber per year. 129
The Sierra Club and the Citizens Council on Conservation and
Environmental Control participated extensively in the initial planning
process and the public comment period, and appealed the decision to
adopt the final Forest Plan.' 3° When the Chief of the Forest Service
twice issued decisions denying their appeal in 1990 and 1992, the two
groups filed suit in District Court. 131 The groups argued that the
119. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. 485, 488-89 (S.D. Ohio 1994). The federally
owned acres are divided into three forest units that comprise 21% of the total forest. Private
tracts of land, some of which the Forest Service plans to purchase eventually, are interspersed
with the federal land. See id. at 488.
120. The Forest Service must identify the issues that the Forest Plan should address; a costbenefit analysis must be done on several alternative management plans and their EIS; and the
regional forester for the region picks the best alternative. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.6, .10, .12.
121. See Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. at 489.
122 See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248, 249 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated sub nom. Ohio
Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998).
123. A silivicultural system is "a management process whereby forests are tended,
harvested, and replaced, resulting in a forest of distinctive form. Systems are classified
according to the method of carrying out the fellings that remove the mature crop and provide
for regeneration and according to the type of forest thereby produced." 36 C.F.R. § 219.3.
124. See Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. at 490. Each management area has a
management prescription which consists of those practices scheduled to be applied on a specific
area to attain multiple-use and other statutory objectives. See id.
125. Clearcutting involves the removal of all trees within areas ranging in size from 15 to 30
acres. See Thomas, 105 F.3d at 249.
126. See Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. at 490.
127. See Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 729.
12& See Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. at 490.
129. See Thomas, 105 F.3d at 249.
130. See Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. at 489.
131. See id.
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Forest Service had "illegally and arbitrarily" adopted clearcutting as
the routine method of forest management and that this decision failed
to consider the impacts that clearcutting had on the environment.132
Not only did clearcutting have detrimental effects on the plant life
and water run-off, but it also caused erosion and soil instability,
effects for which the Forest Plan did not address mitigation
techniques. 13 3 The plaintiffs, therefore, challenged the LRMP for the
Wayne National Forest and the final EIS under the APA, alleging
violations of the NFMA, MUSYA and NEPA.' 34
A. The District Court
The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing to sue
and that the matter was ripe for review. The court did not engage in a
discussion of these issues but instead proceeded directly to identifying
the appropriate standard of review for the agency decision. 35 Indeed,
the court seemed to automatically assume that the case involved
"final agency action" that was ripe for review. 136 The court
recognized that the Forest Plan was "programmatic in nature" and
that implementation would not occur until later in individual sitespecific projects. 137 However, this fact only influenced the court's
138
decision that detailed analysis of specific impacts was not required.
The court ruled on the merits and granted summary judgment to the
judgment pursuant to
Forest Service. 139 The plaintiffs appealed the
4°
Plan."
Forest
the
of
review
court's
the district
B. The Sixth CircuitCourt of Appeals
The court of appeals explicitly addressed the issue of
justiciability and disagreed with the defendant's claims that the issue
was not ripe for review. 4' The court reasoned that the Forest Plan
132 Id. at 490.
133. See id. at 490-91.
134. See id. at 488.
135. See id.
136. A court may decide whether or not the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously only
after finding the requisite finality in the agency action and that the issue is ripe.
137. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. at 491.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 503. The court held on the merits that the Forest Service's actions were not
arbitrary and that the Forest Plan was not contrary to law. See id.
140. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248, 249 (6th Cir. 1997).
141. See id. at 250.
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"represent[ed] significant and concrete decisions that play a critical
role in future Forest Service actions."142 Denying review at the Forest
Plan level may mean that it "would forever escape review.' ' 143 The
court, furthermore, agreed with the district court that the controversy
was ripe, stating that "plaintiffs need not wait to challenge a specific
project when their grievance is with an overall plan."144 Finding the
claim justiciable, the court reached the merits of the case, stating that
the Forest Service had a history of preferring timber production to
other uses.1 45 The court held that the planning process was
improperly predisposed towards clearcutting and that the resulting
LRMP was not in compliance with the NFMA. 46 The case was
reversed and remanded and the Forest Service appealed the decision
to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. 147
C. The Supreme Court
In a rather succinct opinion by Justice Breyer, the Supreme
Court held that the plaintiffs' claim was not ripe for judicial review,
thus dismissing the suit without reaching the merits of the case.'4 The
Court began by reiterating the general purpose behind the ripeness
doctrine and the test set forth in Abbott Labs. 49 The Court then
reformulated the two-part test into a three-part inquiry: (1) whether
review could be delayed without causing hardship to the plaintiffs, (2)
whether judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with
further administrative action, and (3) whether the case would benefit
from further factual development.15 0 The Court answered each
question affirmatively. 51'
In deciding that no significant hardship would befall the plaintiffs
if review were withheld, the Court focused on the fact that several
further administrative steps had to occur before logging actually
occurred.5 2 The Court reasoned that no "significant practical harm"
142.
143.
1992)).
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152-

Id.
Id. (quoting Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1516 (9th Cir.
Id.
See id. at 251.
See id. at 252.
See Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732 (1998).
See id. at 728.
See id. at 732-33.
See id. at 733.
See id. at 733-37.
See id. at 733-34.
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would occur until a particular site proposal was made and the

plaintiffs would have ample time to bring their claim later.1 3 The
Court also noted that the Forest Plan did not create any adverse,
strictly legal effects' 54 or force the plaintiffs to modify their behavior
in order to avoid future adverse consequences such as sanctions. 15
The Court stated that one site-specific victory could potentially

invalidate the Forest Plan on the basis of preclusion,'156 but the Court
also indicated that site-specific challenges could include a challenge to
the Forest Plan as a whole only if the Forest Plan was still relevant at
that point.

57

The Court next determined that judicial intervention would
interfere with the agency's ability to refine the Forest Plan through
revision, amendment, or implementation, 58 essentially denying the
agency

the "opportunity

to correct its own

mistakes""19 and

interfering with the administrative system set up by Congress.16° The
Court also emphasized the fact that Congress had not provided for
pre-implementation judicial review of Forest Plans, as it has in a
number of environmental statutes, and therefore the plaintiffs' suit
161
could not be ripe.
153. Id.
154. The Court stated that the Forest Plan does not command "anyone to do anything or to
refrain from doing anything... [and] create[s] no legal rights or obligations." Id. at 733 (citing
U.S. v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co., 273 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1927)). The use of this case as
precedential authority for the assertion that the Sierra Club would not suffer harm has been
questioned by some commentators. See, e.g., Kristin N. Reyna, Ohio Forestry Association v.
Sierra Club: The United States Supreme Court Reexamines Ripeness in the Context of Judicial
Review of Agency Action, 12 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 249, 260 (1998) (arguing that this older opinion's
pronouncements have been misused by some courts and should be moderated in light of more
recent decisions, citing Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 395,
398 (1965)).
155. See Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 734. According to one critic, the Court's use of Abbott
Labs and Columbia BroadcastSystems, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942), to support the
inference that sanctions are a necessary requirement was inappropriate because neither case
stood for such an idea. See Reyna, supranote 154, at 261.
156. See Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 734-35. The Court in Lujan v. NWF stated that a
"program" may have to be revisited by the agency in order to avoid the unlawful result that a
court could find at a site-specific level. 497 U.S. 871,894 (1990).
157. The Court stated that the Forest Plan could be challenged if and only if"the present
Plan then matters, i.e. if the Plan plays a causal role with respect to the future, then-imminent
harm." Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 734.
158. See id. at 735.
159. Id. (quoting FTC v. Standard Oil, 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980)).
160. See id. at 736.
161. See id. at 737. In Abbott Labs, a case the Court relied heavily on, the defendants also
argued that preenforcement review was unavailable. The Abbott Labs Court, however, rejected
the argument, stating that "'the mere fact that some acts are made reviewable should not suffice
to support an implication of exclusion as to others. The right to review is too important to be
excluded on such slender and indeterminate evidence of legislative intent."' Abbott Lab., 387
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The Court further stated that review would necessarily be
abstract and time-consuming without the focus of on-the-ground
activities. 162 The Court reasoned that, if the issues were "reduced to
more manageable proportions" and "fleshed out by some concrete
action," then the lower courts and the Supreme Court would be
163
better able to deal with the legal questions presented.
IV.

WHY THE FOREST PLANS ARE RIPE FOR REVIEW

The Court's decision to deny review to the Sierra Club because
the claim was not ripe was incorrect because it failed to adequately
account for the real effects that Forest Plans have on the forests and
neglected to consider the negative ramifications of delayed review.
The LRMPs are an example of final agency action that can cause
harm due to their mandatory nature. Because Forest Plans cause
identifiable injury, and because policy considerations favor review,
challenges at the Forest Plan level are ripe.
A. ForestPlans Cause Injury
Contrary to the Court's position, Forest Plans do inflict serious
harm on environmental plaintiffs because they significantly affect
later decisions and activities. The Forest Plans are mandatory and
legally binding. 164 While they are subject to revision and amendment,
the process is a time-consuming one; the Forest Service must follow
the entire procedural framework required for the adoption of the
original Forest Plan and- even minor variations have to be announced
and opened to public comment. 165 The NFMA, forest service
regulations, and administrative rules all require that on-the-ground

U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (quoting JAFFE, supra note 154, at 357).
162 See Ohio Forestry,523 U.S. at 736.
163. See id. at 736-37 (citing Lujan v. NWF, 497 U.S. 871,891 (1990)).
164. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(b). The Court's refusal to grant legal status to LRMPs is also
puzzling in light of the fact that the Court has allowed suits against nonbinding agency actions.
For example, biological opinions were always considered nonbinding and, thus, not a final
agency action because the acting agency retained the legal authority to accept or reject the
recommendations contained therein. See Sam Kalen, Standing on Its Last Legs: Bennett v. Spear
and the Past and Future of Standing in Environmental Cases, 13 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 36
n.219, 41 n.249 (1997). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reached the conclusion that biological
opinions "alter the legal regime to which the action agency is subject," Bennett v. Spear, 520
U.S. 154, 178 (1997), and are final agency actions. Id. This view, except for a statement in the
Bennett Petitioner's brief, is "otherwise wholly unsupported." Kalen, supra, at 40 n.246. See
also infra note 220.
165. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(f).
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projects be consistent with the Forest Plan. 166 The Forest Plan, in
turn, is implemented to a significant degree. 167 Site-specific decisions
must be based on the Forest Plan's directions, 16 and the Forest
Service Chief even stated that the Forest Service "[expects] every
project to be in full compliance with standards and guidelines as set
forth in Forest Plans."' 169 Moreover, this compliance requirement has
been enforced by the courts. 170
In essence, the LRMPs are far more than merely programmatic
frameworks, a fact which makes Ohio Forestry crucially
distinguishable from Lujan v. NWF.17'

Whereas Lujan v. NWF

involved numerous broad regulations that the Court decided needed
to "be reduced to more manageable proportions,' '72 at issue here is a
concrete document that represents the Forest Service's final planning
process for the management of a particular forest. 173

The Forest

Service's assertion that Forest Plans do not impact on-the-ground
activities 74 is, therefore, ridiculous. As one Forest Plan challenger
stated:
[T]he agency has.., spent hundreds of millions of dollars and
countless employee hours on this planning effort. Planning
participants, Forest Service employees, and taxpayers alike must be
quite chagrined to learn that, after huge expenditures of time,
money, and effort, the Forest Service views forest plans as having
influence over subsequent forest
an "extremely conjectural"
75
management activities.

LRMPs dictate how the forest will be managed; projects and
166. See Murphy, supra note 62, at 251.
167. See Garrahan, supra note 90, at 187.
16& See Murphy, supra note 62, at 251 (quoting FOREST SERV. DEP'T OF AGRIC, LAND &
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLANNING HANDBOOK ch. 53).
169. Garrahan, supra note 90, at 186 (quoting F. Dale Robertson, Forest Plan

Implementation (Feb. 23, 1990) (memorandum to regional foresters)).
170. See id. at 186 n.274.
171. Several commentators felt that Ohio Forestry did not need to be distinguished.
Believing that Lujan v. NWF was the beginning of a series of wrongfully decided environmental
cases, the hope was that Ohio Forestry would start to reverse the damage done by Lujan v.
NWF. See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 1, at 11 ("The Court missed a chance to mitigate some of
the damage done by NWF... and to uphold... justiciability in a genuine controversy brought
by a plaintiff with a genuine stake in the outcome.").
172 Lujan v. NWF, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990).
173. See Beth Brennan & Matthew Clifford, Standing, Ripeness, and ForestPlan Appeals, 17
PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 125, 148 (1996). The challenge here is not to broad

administrative regulations but to the product of those regulations, not to general agency
operations but specific agency decisions, manifested in the form of a Forest Plan, which could
cause forest-wide injury. See id. at 149.
174. See supra note 102.

175. Murphy, supra note 62, at 254 (quoting the Reply Brief of Appellant's Reply at n.2,
Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92-35047)).
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activities are proposed, analyzed, and carried out within the
framework of the Forest Plan. 176 The Forest Plan requires that
harvesting occur in those MAs that have been designated as suitable
for timber development. 177 Once an area is classified under the Forest
Plan, that designation is permanent. 178 Therefore, the fact that
additional administrative steps occur, or that third parties would have
to act before actual development takes place, is immaterial. 7 9 Even if
a "no-action" alternative is accepted for that particular project, the
area is still not granted a protected status. 180 The injury, logging in
this case, is therefore threatened by the very existence of the Forest
Plan itself, 8' and even a threatened harm may be sufficiently actual
a2
and imminent to warrant judicial review.'
B.

The Decision Will Impede AppropriateJudicialReview

The Supreme Court's decision has the potential of completely
precluding judicial review of Forest Plans, a result that is contrary to
the ideals of the NFMA and APA. While the Court recognized that a
site challenge could also include a challenge to the lawfulness of the
Forest Plan, 83 in practical terms such a challenge could be impossible.
Common sense implies that a Forest Plan, after going through the
course of administrative appeals and the considerable passage of
time between adoption and implementation, is not likely to receive an
objective or thorough hearing by a court. 84 As one commentator
argued, "it seems likely that a court would treat the plan at [the sitespecific level] as a fait accompli, especially since the court may not be
privy to the administrative record that was developed during the
administrative appeal stage."''8 Two of the circuit courts recognized
the existence of this Catch-22 situation. 186 In Mumma, for example,
176. See United States Forest Service Department of Agriculture, Nature of Land and
Resources Management Plans (LRMPs) also known as Forest Plans (visited March 20, 1999)
<http://www.fs.fed.us/forum/nepa/ decisionm/p2.html>.
177. See Garrahan, supra note 90, at 186.
17& See id. at 153. In order to effect such a change, the Forest Plan would have to be
reevaluated and amended. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(d).
179. See Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1992).
180. See id. at 1516 n.16.
181. See Brennan & Clifford, supra note 173, at 150.
182- See id.
183. See Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 734 (1998).
184. See Garrahan, supra note 90, at 191.
185. Id.
186. The term "Catch-22" is derived from the novel by Joseph Heller by the same name and
means a problematic situation for which the only solution is denied by a circumstance inherent
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the Ninth Circuit astutely observed that a challenge at the project
level would lose most of its force if the overall Forest Plan had
already been approved. 187 With the Forest Service declaring that
"'management decisions ...which were made at the Forest Planning

level are excluded' from appeals of decisions made [at the site-specific
level],"'188 and that land allocation decisions made in the Forest Plan

will not be revisited 189 without judicial review, the end result is an
authorization that is, essentially, immune from any kind of review. 190

Rather than interfering, judicial review would advance the
policies behind the NFMA and APA. The planning process under

the NFMA, as set up by Congress, invited public participation and
was not meant to be insulated from review. 91 Indeed, the NFMA was
a direct result of congressional concern over the dominance of timber
production in forest management and represented a shift away from
the deference that was once given to the Forest Service. 92 The
NFMA's procedural and substantive requirements, and the history of
its passage, 93 all suggest that LRMPs are meant to be concrete and

reviewable decisions, not merely a planning framework without legal
effect. 194 As the appellate court in Thomas stated, judicial review was
intended to be a check on the Forest Service's power and discretion. 95
An inability to challenge the Forest Plans would divest the NFMA of
any meaning' 96 and relegate forest planning to an ad hoc, site-specific

in the problem.
187. 956 F.2d. 1515, 1519 (9th Cir. 1992).
188. Id. at 1516 n.17 (quoting West Moyie ROD at 33).
189. See id. (citing Horizon Forest Resource Area ROD at 9).
190. Indeed, the Forest Service has even refused administrative challenges to site-specific
actions on the basis that the decisions had already been made by the Forest Plan, stating that
"'the administrative procedures for evaluating possible wilderness recommendations are
separate from the procedures employed to consider specific land management activities."' Id.
(quoting West Moyie final EIS at 2-39).
191. See Murphy, supra note 62, at 253. In the context of another environmental statute,
one federal court pointed out that "Congress made clear that citizen groups are not to be
treated as nuisances.., but rather as welcomed participants in the vindication of environmental
interests." Weinberg, supra note 1, at 26 (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165,
172 (2nd Cir. 1976)).
192- See Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 64, at 54, 62-64; see also John Hogan, The Legal
Status of Land Resource Management Plans for the National Forests: Paying the Price for
Statutory Ambiguity, 25 ENvTL. L. 865, 872 (1995).
193. For a discussion of the history behind the passage of the NFMA, see generally
Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 64; Charles Wilkinson, The National ForestManagement Act:
The Twenty Years Behind, the Twenty Years Ahead, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 659,675 (1997).
194. See Hogan, supranote 192, at 894.
195. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248, 252 (6th Cir. 1997).
196. See Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 64, at 117.
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basis. 197
The APA, moreover, was designed to grant wide powers to the
courts to review agency action. 198 This liberal interpretation of

judicial review under the APA was in accordance with general
congressional intent. 199 In fact, a prior Supreme Court broadened the
scope of review under the APA when it held that the exception to
review, those agency actions and decisions committed to agency
discretion by law, 200 was a very narrow one.20 1 The strong
presumption that existed in favor of judicial review of agency actions
was meant to protect against excess and abuse of power by
agencies. 20 2 The Abbott Labs Court observed that "only upon a

showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative
intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review." 203
Insulating a Forest Plan from review would create a final agency
action that could not be challenged, a result that is contrary to both
the NFMA's and APA's presumption of review.2°4
C. The Decision Will Cause Inefficiency
Rather than furthering the pragmatic policies behind ripeness,
this decision could instead promote extreme inefficiency, a result the
doctrine was designed to prevent."
If a Forest Plan challenge is

unripe for its lack of proposed site-specific actions, even a specific
project may not make a challenge to the overall Forest Plan any more
ripe.206 The Supreme Court stated in Lujan v. NWF that "flaws in the
entire 'program'... cannot be laid before the courts for wholesale
correction under the APA simply because one of them that is ripe for

197. See Hogan, supra note 192, at 868. Such a decision "ignores the intent of Congress and
assumes Congress meant to create an exercise in futility by establishing the huge, timeconsuming and expensive forest planning process." Murphy, supra note 62, at 251.
19& See Hust, supra note 19, at 527.
199. See O'Donnell, supra note 51, at 228.
200. 5 U.S.C. § 701(2).
201. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); see also
O'Donnell, supra note 51, at 228 n.5.
202 See Garrity-Rokous, supranote 17, at 643; see also Caldwell, supra note 8, at 351 n.14.
203. Abbott Lab., 387 U.S. at 141 (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962)).
Interestingly, one commentator stated that the Court has in fact "forg[ed] the hitherto-neutral
Article III 'case or controversy' requirement into a weapon to thwart Congressional intent."
Weinberg, supra note 1, at 11.
204. See Garrahan, supra note 90, at 180.
205. See supra note 10.

206. See Garrahan, supra note 90, at 190.
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review adversely affects" a potential plaintiff.20 Moreover, even if
one lawsuit for a specific proposal at the site-specific level prevails, it
will not make a second site-specific action any more imminent.
Plaintiffs would, therefore, be forced to file a lawsuit and revisit the
same justiciability issues for every on-the-ground proposal in order to
accomplish what a single Forest Plan challenge could achieve.208
Such piecemeal litigation would result in a variety of negative
consequences that would impact the agency, plaintiffs, and courts.
For example, the amount of litigation directed at the Forest Service
could increase. The numerous individual suits that plaintiffs would
have to bring if a Forest Plan challenge is not allowed would burden
court dockets, strain agency resources, and prove very expensive for
the government, environmental organizations, and taxpayers alike.2 9
Moreover, inconsistent legal results are a very real potential
repercussion.2 1 The identical issue would be argued repetitively in
different courts and jurisdictions, and inconsistent rulings on the same
issue in various courts would create uncertainty for plaintiffs and
defendants alike.211 The ripeness doctrine was designed to protect
against such inefficiency.212
In fact, the Court in Abbott Labs
advocated pre-enforcement challenges as a means of advancing
agency implementation of a regulatory initiative. Such a challenge
would promote efficiency and speed enforcement by precluding
future challenges with one decree that either curtailed the plaintiffs or
2 13
forced the agency to revise its regulations.
D. Aftereffects of the Decision
Despite the unencouraging holding, Justice Breyer did manage
"to sneak in 214 two items of dicta that may prove beneficial to
environmental interests in the future.2" First, the Court noted that
the injury alleged here was a substantive one: too much logging would
occur under the Forest Plan. This was distinguishable from a
207. Lujan v. NWF, 497 U.S. 871, 893 (1990).
20& See Murphy, supra note 62, at 254.
209. See Sears, supra note 58, at 358.
210. See id. at 358 n.386.
211. See id.
212 See generally Brian Murchison, On Ripeness and "Pragmatism"in Administrative Law,
41 ADMIN. L. REv. 159 (1989).
213. See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner,387 U.S. 136, 154 (1967); see also Garrahan, supra note 90,
at 192.
214. Funk, supra note 1, at 5.

215. See id.
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procedural injury, such as a challenge under the NEPA for the failure
to prepare an adequate EIS.21 6 Second, the Court stated that, had the
original complaint alleged that certain harms would occur
immediately, such as the closing or opening of roads, the challenge
would have been ripe. 217 It was a point that even the government
conceded. 218 This seems to imply that Forest Plans may be attacked in
a roundabout way. Rather than alleging that the Forest Plan permits
too much logging, the plaintiff can assert that recreational areas will
be closed in the areas where logging may occur in order to have a ripe
controversy.
Whether either of these approaches to litigating Forest Plans
would be successful remains to be seen. While a NEPA challenge
may get a plaintiff over the ripeness hurdle, he or she must still
establish standing and, under the Eighth Circuit analysis, an injury
caused by a Forest Plan may not be imminent enough to satisfy the
injury-in-fact requirement. Additionally, under the Court's highly
restrictive standards for environmental challenges, the plaintiff would
be hard-pressed to state an injury that was particularized enough to
warrant review and broad enough that it was redressible only through
a revision of the overall LRMP.
CONCLUSION

Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club resolved the split in the
circuits in favor of the Forest Service by holding that Forest Plans are
not ripe for review. Adopting reasoning closely akin to those circuits
that denied review to Forest Plans, the Court decided that the Wayne
National Forest LRMP was not ripe for review absent site-specific
proposals for on-the-ground activities. In so doing, the Court chose
to ignore the nature of the Forest Plans and the harm that they can
cause.
Congress intended that LRMPs would have exactly the same
effect as site-specific, land-use planning; they were meant to be
binding on future agency actions and enforceable in court.21 9 It is an
intent that is evident in the statutory requirements of the NFMA.

216. See Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 737 (1998). A claim alleging such
a failure to comply with the NEPA may be brought immediately because "the claim can never

get riper." Id.
217. See id. at 738.
21& Id. at 738-39.
219. See Wilkinson, supra note 193, at 675.
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While the Court's interpretation of what constitutes final agency
action at times seems to vary with the interests being protected, 220
Forest Plans are final agency actions that cause concrete and

identifiable injury because of the binding effect they have on the later
actions of the Forest Service in regards to that particular forest.
These issues are sufficiently developed to warrant judicial review. If
access to the courts is restricted, then these Forest Plans may forever

escape review, resulting in litigation for each site-specific project, a
result that thwarts the goals of both the APA and the doctrine of

ripeness itself.

220. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (using an environmental statute to
vindicate an economic interest by finding that a biological opinion was final agency action); see
also supra note 164. One commentator noted that "the history of these [environmental] cases is
reminiscent of the long and notorious use of the Commerce Clause and Substantive Due
Process by an earlier Supreme Court to strike down laws aimed at curbing untrammeled
corporate power." Weinberg, supra note 1, at 11. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918) (holding that Congress could not regulate the shipment of goods made by child laborers);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that states may not regulate labor hours).

